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In this paper, the author considers eight basic fallacies that can arise from using 
conventional wisdom from one-sided markets in two-sided market settings. These 
fallacies are illustrated using statements made in the context of regulatory investigations 
into credit card schemes in Australia and the United Kingdom. The author also discusses 
how these fallacies may be reconciled by proper use of a two-sided market analysis, 
making reference to the relevant economics literature where applicable. The analysis is 
supported by observations on other two-sided markets. 
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Recent regulatory investigations into debit and credit card schemes, such as the 
schemes offered by MasterCard and Visa, have paid little attention to the economics of 
two-sided markets. In this paper, I consider some basic fallacies that can arise when two-
sided networks such as payment schemes are examined based on conventional wisdom 
rather than the logic of two-sided markets. These fallacies are illustrated using the reports 
of the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) and the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC), which investigated the pricing and rules of the credit card schemes 
in Australia, and a report of the Office of Fair Trading (OFT), which investigated the 
pricing and rules of MasterCard in the United Kingdom.  
Two-sided markets involve two distinct types of users, each of whom obtains 
value from interacting with users of the opposite type. In these markets, platforms cater to 
both types of users in a way that allows them to influence the extent to which cross-user 
externalities are internalized. Examples include academic journals which cater to readers 
and authors; airports which cater to airlines and passengers; auctions, B2B markets, car 
fairs, flea markets, shopping malls and trading posts which cater to buyers and sellers; 
‘chatlines’, dating agencies and nightclubs which cater to men and women; conferences 
which cater to speakers and to audiences; debit and credit card payment schemes which 
cater to cardholders and merchants; directory services such as Yellow Pages which cater 
to potential buyers and sellers; employment agencies which cater to employees and 
employers; entertainment platforms (e.g. CDs, color TV, VHS, DVD, Cable TV 
operators, video game platforms, computer operating systems etc) which cater to users 
and content providers; expos and trade fairs which cater to potential buyers and firms 
promoting their goods; magazines, newspapers, public TV operators and web portals 
which cater to information/entertainment seekers and advertisers; publishers which cater 
to readers and authors; quality assurance providers such as ETS which offer GRE and 
TOEFL exams to students and universities; real estate agencies which cater to home 
buyers and sellers, as well as to tenants and landlords; search engines which cater to                                                                                                                                   2  
searchers and websites; stock markets which cater to companies wishing to list and to 
investors/traders (through brokers); and text processors which cater to readers and 
writers.
1 From this long list of two-sided markets, I focus on debit and credit card 
payment schemes since these have generated the greatest policy interest. 
Some of the policy errors that are identified in this paper are not new. Evans 
(2003a) has noted some important antitrust issues raised by two-sided markets, and the 
need to pay attention to the economic logic of two-sided markets. For instance, he notes 
the need to consider both sides of the market when dealing with issues of market 
definition, market power and predation, a point that I will reiterate here. Rochet and 
Tirole (2003b), who argue against the current policy intervention in payment schemes, 
point out the perverse implications of cost-based regulation of individual prices in a range 
of other two-sided markets. The current paper contributes to the existing literature by 
identifying some new fallacies that have not previously been discussed, and by 
systematically illustrating these fallacies using the public statements of regulators. 
The remainder of the article is divided into four sections. Section 2 details the 
eight fallacies using the simple example of nightclubs. Section 3 provides a brief 
overview of how payment schemes work and the economics of interchange fees for the 
reader who is not familiar with this industry. Based on the payment card industry, Section 
4 shows that these fallacies are important in a policy context. It provides quotes from the 
public statements of regulators to illustrate the fallacies identified. The analysis reveals 
the use of conventional wisdom by regulators in the payments industry, rather than the 
logic of two-sided markets. The recent economic theory of payment schemes and two-
sided markets is also contrasted with the regulators’ statements. Finally, Section 5 draws 
some overall lessons for other two-sided markets. 
 
2. The eight fallacies 
This section spells out the eight fallacies that arise from using one-sided logic in 
two-sided markets. These fallacies are easiest to illustrate in the context of a very simple 
industry – that of nightclubs which seek to attract men and women who wish to interact. 
Although the nightclub industry may not be particularly significant for the economy, 
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there are several reasons why nightclubs are particularly instructive in illuminating the 
eight fallacies. 
The nightclub industry is a relatively straightforward one to describe. Unlike 
payment systems, there are no inter-party transfers, or scheme rules, that complicate a 
discussion of the observed outcomes. Individual nightclubs have low setup costs, and 
there is usually frequent entry and exit. At any point in time, there are typically numerous 
competing clubs. Many other examples of two-sided markets, including payment 
schemes, exhibit significant fixed and sunk costs so that normally only a few competing 
platforms will survive in a given market. This provides policymakers one avenue with 
which to explain the features of the industry they find troubling. For instance, if one side 
of the market is being charged more than its costs, this may be explained by a lack of 
platform competition. In the case of nightclubs, such explanations are easy to dismiss. 
Nightclubs that men and women frequent can be considered as two-sided 
markets.
2 Up to a point, men prefer clubs patronized by more women, while women 
prefer clubs patronized by more men. Where it is legal, nightclubs often set different 
entry fees to men and women.
3 These different charges will not generally be internalized 
by either party, even in the case where a man and a woman meet in the nightclub. With 
the possible exception of a couple going out together, when faced with two rival clubs 
(each with an equal number of men and women), men will prefer the club in which they 
pay less and women pay more (and likewise for women). Thus, the chance that two 
individuals will find a match in a particular club will depend not only on the sum of the 
charges to men and women, but also on the structure of the charges to the two types of 
users. To attract customers, clubs need to attract both men and women. By charging 
                                                                                                                                                 
Evans (2003b), and Rochet and Tirole (2003a), while others are new. 
2 Cailluad and Jullien (2003) provide a formal analysis of such matching markets. 
3 Some clubs have a lower cover charge or free entry for women, while others offer a ‘ladies-night’ in 
which women pay nothing to enter the club on a given night of the week. In other cases, women can buy 
drinks at a fraction of the price that men must pay. Club Ing in Hong Kong has a ladies-night every 
Thursday offering free entry and drinks to women, while charging men US$19 for entry which includes 
only one free drink. At Café Vogue in Johannesburg (South Africa) the cover charge is R50 for men, while 
women enter free before 11.30pm. The nightclub at the Hard Rock Hotel in Las Vegas typically has a 
US$20 cover charge for men, but is free for women. Evans (2003a) provides some further examples of 
differential pricing for nightclubs. In some jurisdictions, such pricing is considered sexual discrimination. 
See, for instance, Roth (2003). In the United Kingdom, the Equal Opportunities Commission explicitly 
bans such pricing in the Sex Discrimination Act 1975.                                                                                                                                   4  
women less than men, sometimes they can capture more patrons in total, perhaps because 
on average, men care more about the number of women at the club than vice-versa.
4 
The cost of servicing an additional male and an additional female at a nightclub is 
likely to be quite similar. Thus, there would seem to be no cost basis for charging men 
more than women. Since, on average, nightclubs make little if any economic profit, the 
fact that they charge men more than women suggests women face a price below cost, and 
men face a price above cost. Based on the user-pays principle, one might conclude that 
such an outcome is inefficient. This leads to our first fallacy: 
Fallacy 1: An efficient price structure should be set to reflect relative costs (‘user-
pays’). 
An efficient structure of fees between those charged to men and those charged to 
women should not only take into account the relative costs of serving each type of user, 
but it should take into account the surplus that men enjoy when additional women are 
attracted (and vice-versa). If the surplus obtained by the male clientele from attracting an 
additional woman to the club is greater than vice-versa, then an efficient price structure 
will generally require that the price be lower for women than for men. Given these 
preferences, if prices are set equal, one might expect a club with at least as many men as 
women. Attracting an additional woman to the club raises the surplus to the existing men 
more than attracting an additional man to the club raises the surplus of the existing 
women. An efficient structure of fees will reflect this fact. In contrast, the principle of 
‘user-pays’ is not efficient in such a market.  
A related fallacy arises from another basic principle of economics that can be 
misapplied to two-sided markets – the idea that competition should reduce prices to cost. 
Clearly, it is not true that competition, even perfect competition, will necessarily drive the 
price charged to each type of user to cost. As noted above, competition between 
nightclubs may result in men being charged above cost and women below cost. The 
observation that men are charged above cost does not, therefore, imply anything about 
the market power of the nightclub. 
                                                 
4 This is consistent with Roth (2003). Theoretical models also make such predictions. Armstrong (2002) 
considers a model in which there are a fixed number of users of each type, each of whom values the 
number of users of the opposite type on the same platform, and who choose between participating in one of 
two differentiated platforms. In this model, competition results in prices being set higher to the type of user 
that cares more about the number of users of the opposite side (in this case, men).                                                                                                                                   5  
Fallacy 2: A high price-cost margin indicates market power. 
Where men and women place a different value on matching with each other, a 
club that sets a symmetric fee structure will not generally attract as many users, and will 
not make as much profit, as a club that sets a differential fee structure. Competition will 
drive clubs to offer women cheaper entry fees, or other discounts, to attract the optimal 
balance of men and women at the club. The competitive structure of fees will generally 
not reflect costs. Moreover, the above-cost price to men can be permanently sustained 
above cost. This may simply indicate a difference in the surplus that men and women 
derive from being able to meet more members of the opposite sex.
5 
An immediate corollary of the false identification of market power from a price 
being set above cost is the false identification of predation from a price being set below 
cost.  
Fallacy 3: A price below marginal cost indicates predation. 
As noted in footnote 3, sometimes the cover charge women face is permanently 
set at zero, which is clearly below marginal cost. However, far from representing 
predatory pricing, below-cost prices may be used to generate greater surplus by attracting 
those users (women) that provide the greatest benefits to the network of other users 
(men). While such a price structure may represent an attempt by a firm to attract greater 
market share, since prices can be profitably retained below cost, it would make no sense 
to think of this as predation.
6 
The fourth fallacy considered is the claim that greater competition will necessarily 
result in a more efficient structure of prices. While this may be true in some settings, it 
need not be the case. 
Fallacy 4: An increase in competition necessarily results in a more efficient 
structure of prices. 
Consider the case of a nightclub. A single (monopoly) nightclub will still have an 
incentive to set a lower entry fee for women compared to men. Such a nightclub can 
capture the greater willingness of men to pay, when it attracts additional women. Thus, 
there is no a-priori reason to think that in general, greater competition will result in a 
                                                 
5 To draw inferences about market power through price-cost margins, loosely speaking one would need to 
demonstrate that the sum of fees to men and women was being raised permanently above the costs of 
providing the service to both men and women. 
6 To draw inferences about predation through prices and costs, one would again need to look at the sum of 
fees charged to men and women and relate this to the costs of providing the service to both types of users.                                                                                                                                   6  
more efficient structure of prices. While competition will lower the overall level of prices 
charged to men and women, competition could result in a structure of prices (the relative 
level of entry fees charged to men and women) that is closer to, or further away, from the 
efficient structure.
7 
A related fallacy arises from assuming that greater competition will necessarily 
result in a more balanced price structure. While competition will generally lower the total 
(or average) level of prices charged to men and women, it will not necessarily lower the 
price charged to men relative to women.  
Fallacy 5: An increase in competition necessarily results in a more balanced price 
structure. 
Again, this is a case of anything-is-possible. Competition could lead to a more 
balanced price structure, but it could just as well lead to a greater imbalance in prices. 
Which outcome is more likely to arise will likely depend on the specifications of demand 
and how competition interacts with the demand of each type of user. For instance, if men 
tend to be loyal to particular bars, then greater competition might be reflected in a 
lowering of the price on the more competitive female side (resulting in even more 
imbalanced prices). On the other hand, if women tend to go to several bars during the 
same evening, then greater competition between bars could manifest itself in lower prices 
to men who only need to be attracted to one bar given that women will frequent many. 
One argument sometimes given against the asymmetric pricing structures 
observed on two-sided markets is that while they may be justified in the start-up phase of 
a network, they are no longer justified once the network is established. This type of logic 
gives rise to the sixth logical error considered. 
Fallacy 6: In mature markets (or networks), price structures that do not reflect costs 
are no longer justified. 
Setting prices below cost for one type of user (and above cost for the other) may 
be justified in the start-up phase of a network as a way to overcome a chicken-and-egg 
type problem. For a nightclub, the problem would be how to attract the patronage of men 
given the nightclub attracts no women, and how to attract the patronage of women given 
the nightclub attracts no men. Sometimes, this kind of chicken-and-egg problem can be 
                                                 
7 Rochet and Tirole (2003a) show that for the case with linear demands and in which sellers do not behave 
strategically, the structure of prices in a two-sided market is the same for the case of a monopoly platform 
and competing platforms, where platforms only charge for transactions.                                                                                                                                   7  
resolved by providing free entry of one type, thereby attracting the other.
8 However, even 
once a nightclub has established a base of regular clientele, it will still be beneficial for 
the nightclub (and for overall efficiency) if lower prices are set to women and higher 
prices are set to men if an additional female provides greater surplus to male patrons than 
vice-versa. Thus, a chicken-and-egg problem is not necessary to explain why in two-
sided markets prices may efficiently deviate from cost – if it was, nightclubs would not 
offer discounted entry to women once they are well established.  
Another fallacy arises if the asymmetric pricing structure that platforms set to 
promote demand on their networks is misinterpreted as an economic cross-subsidy. A 
cross-subsidy can arise in economics if one group of users contributes less than their 
incremental cost (the additional cost of providing the services the group consumes, over 
and above the cost of providing the services to others).
9 Assuming the firm at least breaks 
even, this implies some other group of users contributes more than their stand-alone cost 
(the total cost of providing the group with the service they consume), and so is cross-
subsidizing the former group.  
Fallacy 7: Where one side of a two-sided market receives services below marginal 
cost, it must be receiving a cross-subsidy from users on the other side. 
If women are given free entry to the nightclub, this suggests that men are paying 
more than the total costs of providing the night club services that they consume, while 
women are not paying even the incremental costs of providing the services they 
consume.
10 The cross-subsidy in this case would seem to run from men to women. The 
problem with this logic, however, is that it ignores the fact that the service that is being 
provided to each type of user depends on whether the service is also provided to the other 
type of user. The removal of the service to either men or women may result in a loss of 
all revenues to the nightclub given that without attracting both types of users, nightclubs 
will not attract either. In this case, the additional revenue obtained from offering the 
service to women in addition to men is actually the total revenue obtained by the club. 
                                                 
8 See for instance the conquer-and-divide strategy of an entrant described in Caillaud and Jullien (2003). In 
the case of nightclubs, the chicken-and-egg problem may be solved by some opening promotion that 
attracts both types of users simultaneously (say, to get prizes, cheap drinks, etc).  
9 See Faulhaber (1975).  
10 For this discussion, I ignore the possibility that nightclubs make money on the drinks sold to females, 
which could mean that even if women are given free entry, they may still pay more than their incremental 
cost.                                                                                                                                    8  
This means the revenue generated from each type of user will more than cover their 
incremental costs, and hence there cannot be any cross-subsidy.  
Another way of demonstrating the lack of a cross-subsidy is to note that if there 
was a cross-subsidy from men to women, then it would follow that men would 
necessarily be better off if women were banned from the nightclub. It would also imply a 
rival nightclub that just catered to men could set up and profitably undercut the original 
nightclub. Clearly, this would not be the case in our setting. With no female patrons, such 
a nightclub would only be able to charge a fraction of the price to men (if anything). Such 
a ban would not be profitable. In some cases, men may even be worse off if the nightclub 
charged them less and women more. Although such a change in pricing would provide 
men with a direct benefit (a lower cover charge), if the change results in reduced 
patronage by women, it could ultimately make them worse off. This is why a nightclub 
that offers ladies-nights but that has higher charges to men does not necessarily attract 
fewer men. 
The final fallacy I discuss in this paper is the idea that regulating the structure of 
prices of some platforms in two-sided markets is competitively neutral. A regulation of 
one firm (or set of firms) is competitively neutral if it does not provide any competitive 
advantage for rival unregulated firms. One set of firms (A) will obtain a competitive 
advantage over another set (B) as a result of regulations when the regulations make A 
better able to maintain and win customers relative to B. Price regulation in normal 
industries may be competitively neutral if the market is sufficiently competitive. For 
instance, suppose regulations force B to lower its retail prices. Provided the retail price of 
B is not lowered so much that it can no longer cover its costs, this does not enable A to 
better maintain and win customers relative to B. In fact, to maintain its current number of 
customers, A will have to lower its retail prices by roughly the same amount as B. In this 
case, the regulation will not provide any competitive advantage to A. This logic, 
however, does not apply to the individual prices of a two-sided market. 
Fallacy 8: Regulating prices set by a platform in a two-sided market is not 
necessarily competitively neutral, even if the market is very competitive.  
 Forcing a platform to set a lower price on one side of its business may not result 
in its rival(s) following suit. The unregulated platform will not want to match a 
suboptimal structure of prices imposed on the regulated platform. This may provide the 
unregulated platform(s) with a competitive advantage, even though in a one-sided context                                                                                                                                   9  
regulating lower prices for one firm does not generally advantage their unregulated 
rival(s). 
Suppose a certain group of nightclubs is banned from running ladies-nights, 
perhaps on the grounds these discriminate against men.
11 Will the remaining bars still 
want to run ladies-nights or will they be driven to charge men the lower amounts now 
charged by regulated bars? For the very reason ladies-nights are a way to attract more 
business, the remaining bars may still want to charge women less and men more. Even 
though regulated bars will charge men less, many men may still prefer to pay more to go 
to the bars which advertize the ladies-nights, since this gives them a better chance to meet 
women. Overall, the unregulated firms may increase their market share and profits as a 
result of the regulation. The logic of the argument does not depend on the market share of 
the bars that are regulated versus those that remain unregulated, or on the extent of 
competition between bars. 
 
3. A brief overview of card schemes 
While the example of nightclubs was convenient to illustrate how conventional 
wisdom can go astray when applied to two-sided markets, the example of card schemes 
more usefully illustrates the relevance of these fallacies in a policy context, as well as 
better links them to the theoretical literature on two-sided markets. For this reason, this 
section briefly reviews the workings of debit and credit card schemes, such as those 
offered by American Express, MasterCard and Visa.
12 These schemes each create a 
payment instrument which consumers can use for the deferred payment of goods and 
services purchased from merchants, and which merchants can use to receive guaranteed 
payment for goods and services sold to consumers. 
To understand the economics of card schemes, it is simplest to start with a 
discussion of proprietary card schemes, such as those offered by American Express and 
Discover. Such schemes directly attract cardholders who wish to use cards to pay at 
merchants, and merchants who wish to accept such payments from cardholders. A central 
                                                 
11 See Roth (2003) for a discussion of the views of some San Diego nightclubs on being banned from 
running ladies-nights. To the extent there are other nightspots which do not rely on ladies-nights to draw in 
patrons, the ban could shift business away from those that do. 
12 Useful surveys of payment schemes include Evans and Schamlensee (1999), Chang and Evans (2000), 
Chakravorti (2003) and Chakravorti and Shah (2003).                                                                                                                                   10   
decision made by the card scheme is how much to charge cardholders versus how much 
to charge merchants. If one considers only the payment services offered by card schemes, 
such schemes typically recover most of their revenue from merchants. They do this 
through merchant fees, fees that are obtained as a percentage of the value of each card 
transaction. For instance, Evans (2003a) reports that American Express earned 82 percent 
of its revenues from the merchant side of the business in 2001. In contrast, consumers are 
only sometimes charged annual fees, and often are given rebates such as frequent flyer 
miles based on the value of their card transactions. For consumers who do not roll over 
(much) credit card debt, credit cards may cost them nothing to use, or in the case of pure 
transactors, may provide a net financial benefit.  
Since the fees charged to merchants are not typically passed on by merchants to 
their customers who pay by cards, the structure of pricing set by payment networks 
clearly matters.
13 As card schemes charge less to cardholders and more to merchants, 
there will be increased card holding, card usage, and perhaps fewer merchants willing to 
accept cards. By setting the right structure of prices between those charged to cardholders 
and those charged to merchants, a card scheme can achieve its preferred balance between 
getting people to hold and use cards, and having merchants accept cards. If the card 
scheme sets its structure of prices to maximize its profit, it will generally set a structure 
that achieves a high number of card transactions. 
A card association such as MasterCard or Visa faces the same problem as a 
proprietary scheme of achieving the right balance between cardholder and merchant fees. 
However, card associations differ from proprietary schemes since they do not set these 
fees directly. Instead, it is the members of a card association which set these fees. In a 
card association, member banks and other financial institutions deal directly with 
cardholders (these institutions are called ‘issuers’) and with merchants (these institutions 
are called ‘acquirers’).
14 While the scheme administrator authorises, clears and settles 
transactions between issuers and acquirers, it does not directly set retail prices such as 
                                                 
13 In fact, merchants typically set uniform prices regardless of the type of payment. This observation could 
reflect the no-surcharge rules that card associations have adopted to prevent merchants from charging more 
to consumers for purchases made with cards. Evidence from the Netherlands and Sweden suggests even 
without these rules, most merchants do not set differential prices based on the means of payment (see 
Wright, 2003a). 
14 Card associations are sometimes called four-party payment schemes in reference to the four main parties 
involved in the scheme aside from the scheme administrator. These parties are the issuer, the acquirer, the 
cardholder, and the merchant.                                                                                                                                   11   
cardholder annual fees or merchant fees. Instead, to achieve its desired structure of prices 
between those charged to cardholders and those charged to merchants, a card association 
sets what is known as an ‘interchange fee’.  
An interchange fee is a fee paid from the merchants’ bank (the acquirer) to the 
cardholders’ bank (the issuer) whenever the cardholder uses his card to make a purchase 
at a merchant. From the point of view of acquirers, the interchange fee is a cost of 
providing their services to merchants. An increase in the interchange fee will lead to an 
increase in acquirers’ costs for every card transaction they process. Acquirers will 
therefore respond to an increase in the interchange fee by increasing their merchant fees. 
This is true regardless of whether there is a single acquirer, or if there is strong 
competition between different acquirers. Similarly, from the point of view of issuers, the 
interchange fee is a rebate obtained for providing their services to cardholders (a payment 
that they receive). An increase in the interchange fee will mean an increase in the rebate 
issuers’ receive for every card transaction they process. Issuers will therefore respond to 
an increase in the interchange fee by increasing their rebates to cardholders and/or 
decreasing their card fees, so as to encourage more card transactions. This is true 
regardless of whether there is a single issuer, or if there is strong competition between 
different issuers.
15 
The net effect of an increase in a card association’s interchange fee will therefore 
be to increase its acquirers’ merchant fees and to decrease its issuers’ card fees. To the 
extent that the increase in merchant fees exactly equals the decrease in card fees, the only 
effect of an increase in the interchange fee will be a change in its fee structure with no 
change in the overall level of the issuers’ and acquirers’ fees. To the extent that the 
increase in merchant fees does not match the decrease in card fees, changing the 
interchange fee will change the fee structure, and, at the same time, change the overall 
level of the issuers’ and acquirers’ fees. 
In either case, the interchange fee is the key instrument the card association can 
use to achieve a particular structure of cardholder and merchant prices. For instance, if 
MasterCard and its members want to achieve high merchant fees and low card fees, they 
will require a relatively high interchange fee. If MasterCard and its members want to 
achieve high card fees and low merchant fees, they will require a relatively low                                                                                                                                   12   
interchange fee. If the interchange fee is set at zero, then competitive issuers and 
competitive acquirers will each set their prices at the respective costs of dealing with 
cardholders and merchants. In this sense, the interchange fee is the instrument that card 
associations must rely on if they are to set a structure of prices which leads to the right 
balance of cardholder and merchant demand.
16 
 
4. Evidence from policy statements and the academic literature 
In this section, the fallacies described in Section 2 will be illustrated using the 
reports of the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) and the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (ACCC)
17, which investigated the pricing and rules of the credit 
card schemes in Australia, and a report of the Office of Fair Trading (OFT)
18, which 
investigated the pricing and rules of MasterCard in the United Kingdom. Where possible, 
the fallacies will also be related to the academic literature that has been directed at 
understanding the economics of payment schemes. 
Regulators the world over seem to have an overriding desire to set prices based on 
costs. In network settings, in which cross-user externalities are important, the efficiency 
implications of cost-based prices can be undesirable. This is likely to be the case in many 
two-sided markets. Fallacy 1 in Section 2 noted an efficient price structure in a two-sided 
network need not be set to reflect relative costs. User-pays may not ‘pay’! Despite this, 
regulators of payment schemes have called for interchange fees, which determine the 
structure of prices charged to cardholders versus merchants, to be cost-based. For 
instance, the OFT states: 
 
“The OFT’s preliminary conclusion is that MasterCard has not 
justified the level at which it has set its MIF. The OFT accepts that the 
                                                                                                                                                 
15 Since an increase in rebates for cardholders will have similar effects on consumers’ demand as a decrease 
in card fees, for simplicity I will refer to both as simply a decrease in card fees. 
16 In contrast, without separate issuers and acquirers, proprietary schemes set their preferred structure of 
prices directly. 
17 Three documents will be used. These are: Reserve Bank of Australia and Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission, Debit and Credit Card Schemes in Australia: A Study of Interchange Fees and 
Access, October 2000 (hereafter the ‘Joint Study’); Reserve Bank of Australia, Reform of Credit Card 
Schemes in Australia - I - A Consultation Document, December 2001 (hereafter the ‘RBA Consultation 
Document’); and Reserve Bank of Australia, Reform of Credit Card Schemes in Australia – IV – Final 
Reports and Regulation Impact Statement, August 2002 (hereafter the ‘RBA Final Report’). 
18 Office of Fair Trading, MasterCard Interchange Fees – Preliminary Conclusions, February 2003 
(hereafter the ‘OFT Preliminary Conclusions’).                                                                                                                                   13   
MIF could be justified if it was set a level which covered the costs of the 
payment system services which issuers provide to merchant acquirers and 
retailers. These payment system costs would include the costs of 
processing transactions, for example. However, the MasterCard MIF has 




Similarly, the ACCC and RBA state: 
 
“Nonetheless, there are two broad tests which any interchange fee 
regime should be expected to meet if it is to contribute to efficient 
resource allocation. Interchange fees should: • not overcompensate 
financial institutions for the costs that they incur; and • be subject to 
regular review as costs and other conditions in the relevant payment 
network change … Credit card interchange fees are significantly above 
levels suggested by cost-based methodologies.” (Joint Study, p.73) 
 
“Interchange fees are higher than can be justified by costs, and 
scheme members lack clear incentives to bring these fees into line with 
costs.” (RBA Consultation Document, p.6) 
 
The RBA goes on to suggest that user-pays is the correct principle for setting 
prices for credit card services, stating: 
 
“The reforms will have a direct impact on credit cardholders and 
are likely to result in some re-pricing of credit card payment services, but 
such a move towards “user pays” is the means by which the price 
mechanism directs users of the payments system towards the most 
efficient choice of payment instruments.” (RBA Final Report, p.34) 
 
Contrary to these statements, adopting a price structure that reflects the costs of 
serving each type of user (user-pays) would only be efficient by chance. The same can be 
said of an interchange fee that is set equal to the cost of issuing (or any other measure of 
cost). The idea of a cost-based interchange fee is based on treating issuers as providing a 
service only to merchants. Once account is taken of the fact that card schemes also 
provide a service to cardholders, and that both types of users get benefits from a card 
transaction only if both want to use them, then there is nothing particularly desirable 
about cost-based interchange fees (Baxter, 1983).  
                                                 
19 Note the OFT use the acronym ‘MIF’ to refer to the (multilateral) interchange fee.                                                                                                                                    14   
Nor should prices to cardholders and merchants be based solely on the costs that 
these users impose (with competitive issuing and acquiring, this would correspond to 
setting interchange fees at zero). When cardholders use cards for transactions, merchants 
will obtain certain benefits. When merchants accept cards for transactions, cardholders 
will obtain certain benefits. What matters for efficient card usage is that consumers use 
cards whenever the sum of their own and merchant benefits exceeds the sum of the issuer 
and acquirer costs. To achieve this requires an interchange fee which is equal to the 
merchants’ transactional benefits, but decreases with the acquirers’ costs. This is the 
Baxter interchange fee. This ensures consumers take into account their own and their 
merchant’s benefits, and issuing and acquiring costs.
20 
There seems to be an academic consensus that there is no basis for setting 
interchange fees to zero or equal to cost. For instance, Katz states: 
 
“Summarizing the findings on socially optimal interchange rates, 
there are situations in which it is optimal to use interchange fees to 
rebalance the costs and benefits enjoyed by the two sides of a card-based 
transaction. The socially optimal fee level depends on the nature of 
merchant, issuer, and acquirer competition, as well as consumer 
characteristics. As a general matter, when no-surcharge rules are in effect, 
there is little reason to believe that it is optimal to set the interchange fee 
equal to either an issuer’s marginal cost of a card transaction or zero.” 
(Katz, 2001, p. 29) 
 
Rochet and Tirole state: 
 
“In agreement with Katz (2001), we in particular explain why there 
is no economic rationale for cost-based regulation of IFs” (Rochet and 
Tirole, 2003b, p. 69)
21 
 
and Hunt states: 
 
“From the standpoint of policy, the literature suggests three 
important conclusions. First, a variety of factors may result in a privately 
                                                 
20 Loosely speaking, this is also the socially optimal interchange fee that is implied by the analysis of 
Rochet and Tirole (2002), Wright (2003a) and Wright (2003b). In these analyses, competition between 
merchants is taken into account, which implies merchants will already internalize the effect of card 
acceptance on the benefits of their customers who use cards. It remains for consumers to face the right price 
signal. Provided it is consistent with merchants’ accepting cards, the right price signal is given at the Baxter 
interchange fee (or its generalization in Wright, 2003a to the case where different merchants have different 
benefits of accepting cards). The Baxter interchange fee requires some adjustments in the case issuers 
and/or acquirers make positive economic profits. 
21 The authors use “IFs” to mean “Interchange Fees”.                                                                                                                                   15   
determined interchange fee that diverges from the socially optimal fee, 
resulting in payment networks that are either too large or too small.   
Second, a zero interchange fee is generally not socially optimal. And third, 
an interchange fee based purely on costs, ignoring the effect of changes in 
prices on consumers’ and merchants’ demand for payment services, is 
generally not socially optimal.” (Hunt, 2003, p. 88) 
 
The second fallacy considered in Section 2 was the use of high price-cost margins 
on one side of the market as an indicator of market power. Often one might try to infer 
market power from the fact a firm can profitably sustain its price (significantly) above 
cost. However, even in a perfectly competitive two-sided market, it is normal for the 
price on one side of the market to be above cost and the price on the other side to be 
below cost. Such a price structure does not reflect any market power. Rather, this might 
reflect the need to encourage demand by one type of user rather than another, so as to 
increase the total demand for the service. Thus, pricing below cost to cardholders and 
above cost to merchants may be a way of boosting total demand for card transactions, 
even amongst highly competitive card schemes. One cannot sensibly determine that a 
card scheme has market power by finding that merchants pay fees that are above the 
associated cost of acquiring. 
As evidence that regulators are susceptible to this fallacy, note the statements of 
the ACCC and RBA in this regard: 
 
“Competitive pressures in card payment networks in Australia 
have not been sufficiently strong to bring interchange fees into line with 
costs.” (Joint Study, p.iv) 
 
Summarizing the findings of the earlier Joint Study, the RBA states: 
 
“It also found that the fees are higher than the costs incurred by 
issuers in providing credit card payment services to merchants and that – 
because of barriers to entry to the schemes – competition does not seem to 
be bringing these fees into line with costs.” (RBA Consultation Document, 
p.16) 
 
Much of the academic literature on card schemes has been based on the 
assumption of just a single card scheme.
22 Yet, this literature predicts the monopoly 
                                                 
22 See for instance the models of Baxter (1983), Gans and King (2003), Rochet and Tirole (2002), 
Schmalensee (2002), Schwartz and Vincent (2001), Wright (2003a) and Wright (2003c).                                                                                                                                    16   
scheme will set an interchange fee (and a resulting structure of prices) that need not be 
inefficient. Even a monopoly card scheme does not have an obvious incentive to distort 
the structure of prices, unless setting a particular structure of prices can be used to raise 
its overall level of prices (Wright, 2003a). This is unlikely to be possible if there is strong 
competition between issuers and between acquirers. Even where there is a single issuer 
and a single acquirer, Schmalensee (2002) shows a monopoly scheme will set the 
efficient interchange fee in the case where demands are linear and merchants do not 
behave strategically.  
While policymakers have made claims about card schemes using market power to 
set above-cost merchant fees, they have ignored the equally troubling claim on the other 
side of the market – that the below-cost prices set to cardholders indicate predatory 
pricing (Fallacy 3). As noted in Section 2, this fallacy is particularly easy to resolve. 
Since fees to cardholders may be profitably retained below costs, such pricing cannot 
represent a case of predation. 
The fourth fallacy considered in Section 2 was that greater competition between 
platforms in two-sided markets will result in a more efficient structure of prices. Just as 
conventional wisdom holds that cost-based prices are efficient, so it implies that greater 
competition will result in prices moving closer to cost and efficiency improving. While 
such statements may apply to the overall level of prices charged to cardholders and 
merchants, they do not apply to the structure of prices charged to the two types of users. 
In fact, it could be that strong platform competition leads to a more distorted structure of 
prices, with too much being charged to one side relative to the other.
23 It is also possible 
that a monopolist will set the same structure of prices as set by competing platforms.
24  
In contrast to the logic of two-sided markets, the regulators of payment schemes 
have stuck with conventional wisdom. The OFT claims that the collectively set 
interchange fee: 
“removes incentives for the parties to enter into bilateral agreements, 
which can be expected to mean that there will be little or no competition 
                                                 
23 Guthrie and Wright (2003) show that price competition between two identical card associations can lead 
to the platforms setting interchange fees too low (providing some consumers want to hold both cards). They 
also consider a case, in which all consumers only hold one card, in which competition results in an 
interchange fee that is higher than that set by a monopolist scheme. 
24 Rochet and Tirole (2003a) show this is the case in a model of competing platforms in which demands are 
linear and sellers do not behave strategically.                                                                                                                                   17   
between them over the level of the interchange fee.” (OFT Preliminary 
Conclusions at 3.3) 
 
The OFT goes on to claim that the collectively set interchange fee: 
 
“leads to higher merchant service fees which will be passed on to 
consumers through higher retail prices.” (OFT Preliminary Conclusions at 
3.4) 
 
The implicit assumption is that more competition over the interchange fees, in this 
case by way of bilateral agreements between individual issuers and acquirers, will be 
desirable.
25 The RBA is more explicit, stating: 
 
“Competition between payment instruments is critical to the claim 
that interchange fees cannot rise above “efficient” levels because such 
competition will keep them in check.” (RBA Consultation Document, 
p.37) 
 
“In Australia, credit card interchange fees are not determined by a 
competitive market. While it is possible that a collective process may lead 
to interchange fees being set at an efficient level, the conditions under 
which this is likely to occur in practice – strong competition between 
credit card schemes, strong competition between credit cards and other 
payment instruments, and a balance of issuing and acquiring interests in 
the fee-setting process – do not prevail in Australia. … Where the 
competitive environment is not robust, the risk is that collectively set 
interchange fees can be above an efficient level …” (RBA Final Report, 
p.8)  
 
“Until there is more robust competition, the circumstances under 
which credit card interchange fees are collectively set in Australia create 
the risk that interchange fees would not be set at an efficient level, 
resulting in distorted price signals to cardholders and merchants.” (RBA 
Final Report, p.33) 
 
These statements also suggest that the RBA holds the view that greater 
competition between schemes will result in more symmetric prices (Fallacy 5). This 
follows from the RBA’s argument (given above) that the unregulated interchange fees in 
Australia were above the efficient level, and that the culprit was a lack of competition 
between payment schemes. The implication is that greater competition will decrease 
                                                 
25 Small and Wright (2001) show that allowing interchange fees to be set bilaterally by competing issuers 
and acquirers can lead to an escalation of interchange fees above the level set collectively.                                                                                                                                   18   
interchange fees, thereby decreasing merchant fees and increasing card fees, resulting in a 
more balanced set of fees. However, as the discussion of Fallacy 5 makes clear, there is 
no general principle in two-sided markets that ensures greater platform competition will 
result in more balanced fees.
26 In the context of interchange fees, this implies that greater 
scheme competition cannot guarantee lower interchange fees, and therefore merchant 
fees. Despite this, the RBA state: 
 
“In the absence of regulatory action by the Reserve Bank, 
merchants would continue to pay a higher price for credit card acquiring 
services than if more competitive conditions prevailed.” (RBA, Final 
Report, p.16) 
  
Fallacy 6 states that in mature networks, there is no need for prices to deviate 
from costs as network effects will no longer be important. In the context of payment 
schemes, the implication is that once the networks are well established, interchange fees 
can be set at zero. In this case, competitive issuers will simply pass on their costs to 
cardholders, and competitive acquirers will pass on their costs to merchants. While 
policymakers have generally stopped short of suggesting that interchange fees for credit 
card networks should be set to zero
27, they have suggested network effects no longer 
provide a justification for prices or interchange fees deviating from costs. For instance, 
the ACCC and the RBA state: 
 
“The intent of an interchange fee is to ensure that network benefits 
are taken into account by overriding the usual market mechanisms under 
which buyers and sellers compare private costs and benefits. While this 
may be justified in the early stages of development of a payment network, 
the weakening of normal price signals in a mature network can lead to 
higher interchange fees than are necessary to establish and maintain the 
viability of the network.” (Joint Study, p.28) 
 
“Interchange fees may have played an important part in the 
development of these networks, but by their nature they have done so by 
reducing the potency of the normal market mechanisms which determine 
consumer choice and resource allocation. While a pricing system based on 
                                                 
26 Both Guthrie and Wright (2003) and Rochet and Tirole (2003) find cases where competing schemes set 
the same structure of fees as a single scheme. Guthrie and Wright also find cases in which competition 
results in a more symmetric fee structure and a case in which competition results in a more asymmetric fee 
structure. 
27 The ACCC and RBA have proposed zero interchange fees for the on-line debit card system (EFTPOS) in 
Australia (Joint Study, pp. 68-69).                                                                                                                                    19   
interchange fees still seems to be the most practical arrangement for the 
credit card network, the levels of interchange fees are high relative to costs 
and fees of this magnitude are not essential to the continued viability of 
this network.” (Joint Study, p. 80) 
 
It is not clear why the viability of the network is the relevant criterion for setting 
interchange fees (or the structure of prices) in payment schemes. The argument given 
seems to be that for the initial development of payment networks, interchange fees were 
needed to ensure the viability of the schemes, but they are no longer needed. It is true that 
provided there is not a loss of business to proprietary schemes, the existing payment 
schemes would still be viable with interchange fees set at zero (competing issuers and 
acquirers would adjust their prices accordingly to retain profitability). However, it is not 
clear why scheme viability is the relevant criterion for setting interchange fees. One does 
not need a chicken-and-egg problem to justify setting interchange fees. Instead, since any 
card transaction involves two parties, there is a role for interchange fees to ensure 
consumers face the joint costs and benefits of their decisions. This is just as true in a 
mature network as it is in a start-up network.
28 
Another error made by the policymakers is to confuse the use of transfers between 
the different sides of a two-sided market, and the concept of a cross-subsidy.
29 The idea is 
that consumers who pay by credit card but who pay off their balance in full at the end of 
the month pay nothing towards the costs of the services they enjoy, and so they must 
enjoy a cross-subsidy from some other users. Since merchants cover these costs through 
merchant fees, and since merchants are funded by all their customers, the cross-subsidy 
must be between those paying by alternative means and those paying by credit cards.
30 In 
particular, the ACCC and RBA state: 
 
“A greater contribution by cardholders to the costs of using a credit 
card would provide scope to lower interchange fees, merchant service fees 
                                                 
28 It is notable that in the existing payment schemes literature, the role of the interchange fee is derived 
under the assumption of mature networks. Self-fulfilling equilibria in which a scheme will not attract any 
users because none are expected to join are not considered. Caillaud and Jullien (2003) study a chicken-
and-egg problem in a generic two-sided market, and show that the structure of fees can sometimes be used 
by an entrant firm to overcome the chicken-and-egg problem. 
29 This is Fallacy 7 in Section 2. 
30 Since in practice consumers pay by different means at different times, since most consumers use credit 
card debt at some point in time, and since some other instruments may be just as expensive for merchants 
to accept as credit cards, the factual basis for claims about transfers between different groups of users is not 
obvious.                                                                                                                                    20   
and prices of goods and services. The present fees charged to merchants 
are ultimately passed on to all consumers – not just those using credit 
cards – in the form of higher prices of goods and services. In effect, credit 
card users are being cross-subsidised by other customers. One way of 
ensuring that cardholders bear more of the costs is through increases in 
direct charges by card issuers.” (Joint Study, p.52) 
 
“To the extent that credit card payments are more costly for 
merchants than some other payment instruments, displacement of these 
instruments by credit cards raises merchants costs. These costs are 
ultimately passed on to all consumers in the form of higher prices, giving 
rise to the cross-subsidisation of credit card users mentioned above.” 
(Joint Study, p.54)  
 
“Cardholders who use credit cards purely as a payment instrument 
contribute least to the cost of credit card schemes and, in some cases, are 
effectively paid to use credit cards. A greater contribution from such 
cardholders would reduce the subsidy they receive from other consumers.” 
(Joint Study, p. 59) 
 
However, contrary to the suggestion of the ACCC and RBA, there is no cross-
subsidy in this case. To see this most simply, consider the case of an American Express 
charge card, which merchants pay for through merchant fees, and which consumers pay 
nothing to use. Suppose some consumers use this card, while all other consumers use 
cash (which is assumed to be costless). Suppose, further, that the price of goods sold by 
merchants is increased to cover the merchant fee. Even under these somewhat extreme 
assumptions, users of American Express charge cards do not enjoy a cross-subsidy from 
cash-users. If they did, then a merchant would be better off if the consumers who pay by 
American Express charge cards were banned from using the card for purchases at the 
merchant’s store. One can safely assume this is not the case, for if it were, it would 
contradict the fact the merchant voluntarily chooses to accept cards, presumably to 
increase overall profits. Another test of whether a cross-subsidy exists is whether card 
paying customers increase American Express’ revenue by less than the additional costs 
they give rise to. Again, this cannot be the case. Without attracting these cardholders, 
American Express would not attract any merchant fees, and so it cannot be better off by 
excluding such users.
31 
                                                 
31 Even if non-card users are worse off as a result of consumers using credit cards, this does not constitute a 
cross-subsidy, but rather reflects the fact that the existence of credit cards may have distributional effects.                                                                                                                                    21   
The final fallacy considered in Section 2 was the claim that the regulation of 
prices in two-sided markets is competitively neutral. This is a matter of particular 
importance in the context of regulating interchange fees. Since the interchange fee is the 
primary instrument a card association can use to influence the structure of prices to 
cardholders versus merchants, regulating interchange fees is akin to fixing this structure 
of prices within card associations. This provides proprietary schemes, which do not 
require an interchange fee to achieve their desired price structure, with a potential 
competitive advantage.
32  
The RBA dismisses this view when they state: 
 
“The Reserve Bank’s proposed standards and access regime will 
apply to the three designated credit card schemes, Bankcard, MasterCard 
and Visa. The “three party” card schemes – American Express and Diners 
Club – do not have collectively set interchange fees nor restrictions on 
entry enforced by existing members, and the Reserve Bank saw no case on 
public interest grounds to designate these schemes to deal with these 
issues.” (RBA Consultation Document, p.1x) 
 
“Submissions have also argued that a standard for interchange fees 
in the designated credit card schemes will prevent these schemes from 
being able to compete effectively with the three party card schemes. This 
raises the question of the nature of competition between four and three 
party card schemes in Australia. On the basis of network size, the four 
party credit card schemes would appear to have a dominant market 
position compared with the smaller three party card schemes.” (RBA 
Consultation Document, p.118) 
 
  “If a standard for interchange fees resulted in lower merchant 
service fees in the designated credit card schemes, normal competitive 
processes would ensure that competitors would have to react.” (RBA 
Consultation Document, p.119) 
 
The RBA argues that because merchant fees will decrease (as a result of lower 
interchange fees) in card associations, competition will cause proprietary schemes to also 
decrease their merchant fees. In the RBA’s view, interchange fee regulation will be 
competitively neutral. However, this view of competition is one-sided. Competition does 
not just lower prices on one side of the market. Rather, competition between schemes 
                                                 
32 The lack of an explicit interchange fee in proprietary schemes simply reflects these schemes’ different 
organizational form. Despite the lack of an explicit interchange fee, proprietary schemes still care about 
getting the right structure of fees between cardholders and merchants. They still charge merchants more                                                                                                                                   22   
takes place with respect to both sides of the market simultaneously. If card associations 
are prevented from setting a structure of prices that maximizes the value of their schemes 
to their customers (both cardholders and merchants), the demand for their card 
transactions will fall relative to proprietary schemes. 
Guthrie and Wright (2003) demonstrate this result formally, showing that if one 
card association has its interchange fee regulated below the level that it would choose 
privately, an identical competing scheme that is left unregulated will be able to capture 
the whole market. The analysis highlights the flaw in the logic that just because the 
regulation of lower interchange fees will cause merchant fees to decrease, proprietary 
schemes will be forced to also decrease their merchant fees by similar amounts. This 
logic is based on treating the card schemes as providing a service only to merchants. It 
ignores the fact that the card schemes also provide a service to cardholders, and that the 
demand by cardholders and merchants is interdependent. A decrease in interchange fees 
will lead to an increase in card fees at the same time as it leads to a decrease in merchant 
fees. Moreover, any reduction in consumers’ demand to use cards will make accepting 
cards less critical to merchants as a way of attracting business. The overall effect of the 
regulation of interchange fees may reduce the demand for the regulated card associations. 
In this case, proprietary schemes will enjoy an increase in demand at the expense of card 
associations. 
Notice this situation is quite different from standard price regulation that imposes 
a cap on firms’ retail prices. Lower retail prices will make the regulated firms more 
popular with users, not less. In such a scenario, rival unregulated firms will have to match 
the price reductions to avoid losing business to the regulated firms. This would not 
constitute a failure of competitive neutrality. The difference here is that an interchange 
fee is not a retail price set by the card association but rather an instrument that the card 
association can use to influence the structure of retail prices between those charged to 
cardholders and those charged to merchants. Competition will not force proprietary 
schemes to match a suboptimal fee structure imposed on card associations through 
regulation. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
than consumers for the payment service associated with their cards. This, in turn, enables them to offer 
more value to their customers and to increase the use of their cards.                                                                                                                                   23   
4. Concluding remarks 
This paper has addressed some common errors that arise from applying 
conventional wisdom to two-sided markets. The potential importance of these errors for 
policy was illustrated by the statements of government authorities in Australia and the 
United Kingdom with respect to card payment schemes.  
Some general lessons for other two-sided markets follow. First, the paper 
highlights the importance of taking into account both sides of the market (and the 
interdependence between both sides of the market) in any analysis of two-sided markets. 
For instance, when analyzing mergers in the magazine and newspaper industry, it would 
make little sense to consider the impact of the merger only on circulation prices and 
ignore the implications for advertising rates as was done in a recent investigation in 
Germany.
33 Similarly, it would be wrong to conclude a magazine has market power by 
focusing solely on its price-cost margin on the advertising side.  
Second, the paper emphasizes the importance of the structure of prices between 
the two sides of the market as a strategic instrument, in addition to the overall level of 
prices. Understanding how this instrument can be used to maximize the joint benefits to 
both types of customers is critical to determining efficient prices in a two-sided market. 
The results may be very different from the normal marginal cost pricing familiar in one-
sided markets. It should thus not be surprising that relative prices do not reflect relative 
costs in almost all two-sided markets. Otherwise, shopping malls would charge 
consumers for entry, Adobe Acrobat would charge the same for Adobe Reader as Adobe 
Writer, academics would pay hefty fees when submitting their articles to journals, buyers 
and sellers would pay the same amount in auctions and trading posts, and users would 
pay to search the Internet. 
A final point worth emphasizing about two-sided markets is that there is no 
obvious reason to expect competition to lead to a more efficient structure of prices than 
would be set by a monopoly platform. In this respect, the choice of price structure is a bit 
like the choice of product quality by a monopolist. While clearly a monopolist has an 
incentive to reduce its quantity so as to raise prices, it is not obvious whether a 
monopolist will choose an insufficient or an excessive level of product quality. Whether a 
monopolist selects too much or too little quality rests on differences in the effects of                                                                                                                                   24   
increased quality on the marginal versus the average consumer. The monopolist considers 
the effect on the marginal consumer while the social planner considers the effect on the 
average consumer. This same kind of concern is likely to apply to the choice of price 
structure in two-sided markets, suggesting any market failure is likely to be quite subtle. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
33 <Get reference from Ulrich Kaiser>.                                                                                                                                25
   
   
References 
 
Armstrong, Mark (2002) “Competition in Two-Sided Markets,” Nuffield College, Oxford 
University, Working Paper. 
Baxter, William (1983). “Bank Interchange of Transactional Paper: Legal Perspectives,” 
Journal of Law and Economics 26, 541-588. 
Caillaud, Bernard and Bruno Jullien (2003) “Chicken & Egg: Competition Among 
Intermediation Service Providers,” RAND Journal of Economics 34(2), 309-328.  
Chakravorti, Sujit (2003) “Theory of Credit Card Networks: A Survey of the Literature,” 
Review of Network Economics 2(2), 50-68.  
Chakravorti,Sujit and Alpha Shah (2003). “Underlying Incentives in Credit Card 
Networks,” The Antitrust Bulletin (forthcoming). 
Chang, Howard and David Evans (2000) “The Competitive Effects of the Collective 
Setting of Interchange Fees by Payment Card Systems,” The Antitrust Bulletin 45, 
641-677. 
Evans, David (2003a) “The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets,” Yale 
Journal on Regulation (forthcoming). 
Evans, David (2003b) “Some Empirical Aspects of Multi-sided Platform Industries,” 
Review of Network Economics 2(3), 1-20. 
Evans, David and Richard Schmalensee (1999) Paying with Plastic: The Digital 
Revolution in Buying and Borrowing, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Faulhaber, Gerald (1975) “Cross-Subsidization: Pricing in Public Enterprises” American 
Economic Review 65(5), 966-977. 
Guthrie, Guthrie and Julian Wright (2003). “Competing Payment Schemes,” Working 
Paper No. 245. Department of Economics. University of Auckland. 
Katz, Michael (2001) “Reform of Credit Card Schemes in Australia II: Commissioned 
Report” RBA Public Document. August. 
Rochet, Jean-Charles and Jean Tirole (2002). “Cooperation among Competitors: Some 
Economics of Payment Card Associations,” RAND Journal of Economics 33(4), 
549-570. 
Rochet, Jean-Charles. and Jean Tirole (2003a) “Platform Competition in Two-Sided 
Markets,” Journal of the European Economics Association (forthcoming). 
Rochet, Jean-Charles. and Jean Tirole (2003b) “An Economic Analysis of the 
Determination of Interchange Fees in Payment Card Systems,” Review of Network 
Economics 2(2), 69-79.                                                                                                                                26
   
   
Roth, Alex (2003) “Kiss Ladies Night Goodbye,” The San Diego Union Tribute, August 
3. http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/metro/20030803-9999_1m3ladies.html 
Schmalensee, Richard (2002) “Payment Systems and Interchange Fees,” Journal of 
Industrial Economics 50, 103-122. 
Schwartz, Marius and Daniel Vincent (2001) “Same Price, Cash or Credit: Vertical 
Control in Electronic Payments Networks” mimeo. November. 
Small, John and Julian Wright (2001) “The Bilateral Negotiation of Interchange Fees in 
Payment Schemes,” mimeo, NECG and University of Auckland.  
Wright, Julian (2003a) “Determinants of Optimal Interchange Fees in Payment Systems,” 
Journal of Industrial Economics, forthcoming. 
Wright, Julian. (2003b) “Pricing in Debit and Credit Card Schemes,” Economics Letters 
80, 305-309. 
Wright, Julian. (2003c) “Optimal Card Payment Systems,” European Economic Review 
47, 587-612. 